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TAXPAYERS AS VICTIMS: TAXPAYER
HARM & CRIMINALIZATION
Brenner M. Fissell*

INTRODUCIiON

The majority of criminal statutes deal with force and fraud, or
their attempt, when employed against another individual. Whenever
conduct is understood to affect only the individual actor, many
people become uncomfortable and suspicious by its criminalization.
The recent smoking debate is illustrative of this instinct: it is now a
crime to smoke in most places that expose others to one's
secondhand smoke, but no jurisdiction has gone so far as to criminalize smoking in all cases, for the good of the individual smoker.1
How, then, can we account for the proliferation of personal safety
crimes, all ostensibly aimed solely at the good of the actor? Why, for

*Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2013. A.B. Georgetown University, 2009; M.Phil. Cambridge, 2010. The author thanks Profs. Guyora Binder,
Silas Wasserstrom, Albert Lauber, Neha Jain, and John Hasnas of Georgetown, as
well as Jordan Blair Woods and Sandy Steel of Cambridge for their comments and
criticism.
1 See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399n-x (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2004) (banning smoking only in public places).
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example, is it a crime not to wear a seatbelt? Why can we be arrested for failing to evacuate our homes during a disaster? To rebut the
charge of intrusive paternalism, and avoid arousing the suspicion
mentioned above, lawmakers in this area have found it necessary to
buttress "sanctity of life" arguments with something more. They
have strained to justify these proposed or existing criminal prohibitions as really affecting the lives of other people besides the actor,
and in a detrimental way. In doing this, they have sought to bring
these prohibitions squarely within the heartland of the predominating individualistic sentiments of many citizens.
Over the past fifty years, a new argument has arisen that enables
lawmakers to do just that. I call it the taxpayer-harm2 argument, and
remarkably, it has received almost no attention by legal scholarship.
It generally looks like this: Because the government now provides a
great many services to individuals, and yet these services must inevitably be paid for through taxes, it makes sense to say that any
individual conduct that leads to the provision of those services ultimately affects everyone else-such conduct incurs government
spending, which is in turn a cost borne by the taxpayers. While the
taxpayer-harm argument can be (and has been) used to justify a
great myriad of governmental restrictions, 3 this Article will focus on

2The term is my own.
3Most prominently, it has appeared in the recent debate over the Affordable
Care Act, which created a tax penalty and not a criminal sanction. See Brief for
Petitioner, Dep't. of Health & Human Serv. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. (2012) (No. 11398). ("As a class, the uninsured actively participate in the health care market,
but they pay only a fraction of the cost of the services they consume ....The
minimum coverage provision addresses those defects [and] creates a financial
incentive (by means of a tax penalty) for uninsured participants in the health
care market to internalize their own risks and costs, rather than externalizing
them to others.") (citations omitted). This rationale was also discussed in Chief
Justice Roberts' opinion:
"According to the Government, the health care market is characterized by
a significant cost-shifting problem. Everyone will eventually need health
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how it has been used by legislators, judges, and commentators to
justify criminal statutes. Overall, I argue that this reliance is mistaken, and that civil, not criminal law, is the more appropriate mechanism to use when addressing taxpayer-harming conduct.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Section I, I will provide the
intellectual background that has preceded this new development,
putting the argument in context. In Section II, I will show evidence
of the argument as it has actually played out in courts, legislatures,
and academic circles with respect to four major examples: seatbelt
laws, motorcycle helmet laws, dangerous sport restrictions, and
mandatory evacuations. 4 From these examples, a general argument

care at a time and to an extent they cannot predict, but if they do not have
insurance, they often will not be able to pay for it. Because state and federal laws nonetheless require hospitals to provide a certain degree of care to
individuals without regard to their ability to pay ... hospitals end up receiving compensation for only a portion of the services they provide. To
recoup the losses, hospitals pass on the cost to insurers through higher
rates, and insurers, in turn, pass on the cost to policy holders in the form of
higher premiums." NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012).
An older example involves wrongful death actions. The Supreme Court found the
creation of this cause of action within the police power because "while in the interest
of the public, it also tends to avert the dependency or pauperism of the survivors by
shifting the burden of their support, in part at least, from the community to the authors of the wrong." Hess v. United States., 361 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1960) (quoting The
City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1893)), modified sub nom. The Transfer No. 4,
61 F. 364 (2d Cir. 1894)). Evidence can also be found in the well-known case striking
down Lochnerian substantive due process -taxpayer harm here justifies a minimum
wage law: "What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay."
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). These variants are not what is
at issue in this paper, which is criminalization.
4 The argument is also likely to be found in discussions regulating the consumption of harmful substances, such as tobacco and drugs, but for various reasons these
will not be discussed here. With cigarettes and drugs, the argument muddies because of the effect the substance has on the cognitive abilities of the actor (addiction
or worse), and also the easier attribution of harm to others through second-hand
smoke or increased propensity to commit crimes or act violently. For these reasons
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can be distilled and will be classified by its appropriate theoretical
labels.
In Section III, I will offer a critique of the taxpayer-harm argument from the standpoint of contemporary criminal law theory.
While such a justification for criminalization might make sense
within the most extreme utilitarian understanding of the criminal
law's purpose, under prevailing views it cannot hold water for
three reasons. First, the argument is unable to satisfy the requirement that a legally cognizable harm has been inflicted, as no interest
has been set back by engaging in the conduct at issue. Second, no
wrong has been committed, as the taxpayers possess no right to
avoid payment of taxes, and the mental state associated with the
conduct does not rise to the necessary level of culpability. Third,
and finally, even if a harmful wrong has been committed, the argument prevents it from being seen as one of public concern, as the
conception of the wrongful harm is framed in such a narrow way
that it cannot be said to affect the substantial number of people who
pay no taxes. Beyond these problems in theory, I will also discuss
the practical absurdities that arise in the application of this argument. Even though most of the laws it has justified have small penalties, they are nevertheless criminal prohibitions in a system where
police investigatory and detention powers are vast whatever the
crime may be. It is not that these laws are totally unjustifiable - they
could rest upon arguments that emphasize the value of human life,
or perhaps public order 5-but that their use of this argument does
not justify the criminal sanction.

cigarettes and drugs are less pure examples of the "hard" paternalism at issue, and
are therefore omitted. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 12 (1986); Amartya Sen,
Unrestrained Smoking is a Libertarian Half-Way House, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007 (discussing problem of addiction in the analysis).
5Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 108 (R. Wasserstrom
ed., 1971). Indeed, most laws are supported by multiple justificatory arguments.
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In Section IV, I will offer a solution by advocating for a shift from
the criminal paradigm to that of civil liability. Civil law, with its
compensatory and morally neutral purpose, along with its resultsfocused attachment of liability, is more appropriately tailored to
address taxpayer harms than criminal law, which has a punitive
and morally-charged aim, and an emphasis on mental states over
results. Importantly, this shift would end the practical absurdities
created by the criminal law's investigatory powers when applied to
such innocuous conduct. By modifying our conception of the taxpayer harm to be one of a civil violation, and not criminal offense,
we find solutions both in theory and in practice, and all without
sacrificing the proffered impetus behind the original statutes-the
preservation of the government's financial well-being.
I. BACKGROUND

A brief look at the intellectual history of the taxpayer-harm argument will help to place it in the context of a gradually expanding
"Harm Principle." John Stuart Mill was one of the earliest and most
notable proponents of this idea: the State may interfere with individual liberty only when the exercise of that liberty harms someone
other than the individual exercising it.6 While this is an extreme
form of the argument, and makes harm to others a necessary condition of interference, most everyone agrees that harm to others is at
7
least "always a good reason" to interfere.

6 "[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any mem-

ber of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others," Mill
famously wrote. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978)
(1859).
7 This is Joel Feinberg's position. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 26 (1984).
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Because of the Harm Principle's widespread popular appeal, a
strange phenomenon began to occur. Instead of truly working as a
limiting principle upon State interference, political actors merely recast their arguments for interference so as to satisfy its terms-the
ambiguous idea of "harm" led to the principle's inevitable expansion,8 and the concept came to mean whatever was most exigent for
a given advocate. 9 In legal scholarship, Richard Epstein was one of
the first to observe and analyze this phenomenon in depth: 10
"During the nineteenth century, the principle
served as a bulwark of liberty and a limitation on
the scope of government power. By degrees, however, it has been transformed towards the end of
the twentieth century into an engine of social control that is said to justify major government intervention in all its manifestations ....
While the general form of the principle has remained unchanged,
far more content has been poured into the exception 'harm or evil to others.' The principle that was
once a shield of individual liberty has been forged
into a sword against it."11
Epstein went on to note two salient examples -environmental
"harms" and economic "harms." 12 By conceiving of some overarch-

8 There is "a natural tilt in the original, simple harm principle-a natural tilt that
favors a finding of harm." Bernard Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J.
GRIM. L. & Criminology 109, 186 (1999).
9 As Feinberg mentions, almost in passing, "[miost of the controversial criminal
statutes that receive apparent blessing from the principles alternative to the harm
principle, however, have often been said to have support also from the harm principle itself"; this is accomplished by an appeal to "partially concealed or indirect causal process[es]." Feinberg, supra note 7, at 13.
1
0 See Richard Epstein, The Harm Principle - And How it Grew, 45 U. TORONTO L.J.
369, 375-97 (1995).
11Id. at 371.
12Id. at 408.
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ing, universal interests, it was possible to understand traditionally
harmless activity as harmful to others. The distinction between harm
13
to self and harm to others was "relax[ed]."
Four years later, the Harm Principle came into focus again in an
article by Bernard Harcourt.14 Harcourt observed that traditionally
moralistic initiatives, such as pornography prohibitions, began to
appeal increasingly to a justification devoid of any mention of morality: namely, the Harm Principle. 15 Harm, and not morality, was
what warranted the restrictions -or so it was argued. While Epstein
called this a growth, Harcourt called it collapse: "The harm princi16
ple is effectively collapsing under the weight of its own success."
With the Principle co-opted and forced to serve ends traditionally
foreign to it, he noted that it no longer functioned as a true delineator between moralism and liberalism. 17 Now, the observer is presented with "a harm free-for-all: a cacophony of competing harm
18
arguments."
This Article continues the project of Epstein and Harcourt, and
adds yet another class of unexpected "harms" to the growing list,
and one that has so far been unanalyzed by scholars: taxpayer
harms. As alluded to earlier, the taxpayer-harm notion understands
any activity that increases government spending (through services
provided to the individual engaging in it) to be a "harm" to the
community that meets the demands of the Harm Principle. The taxpayer-harm argument expands individuals' scope of vulnerability
to harm through the intermediary of the government apparatus,
linking all into a commonly shared undertaking of loss or reward. It

13Id.
14

See generally, Harcourt, supra, note 8.

I Id. at 110.
16Id.at 113.
17 Id. at 114.
18 Id. at 119.
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is only through this intermediary that the essential demand of the
Harm Principle - that another person be harmed - can be met in the
context of what would normally be seen as completely selfregarding activity. The Harm Principle, then, is now used to justify,
beyond moralism, another philosophical position that is traditionally opposed to it: paternalism. The collapse (or expansion) of the
Principle continues.
For all its prevalence, though, the argument has received little
serious attention by major commentators. Donald Regan, 19 Gerald
Dworkin, 20 John Kleinig, 21 and Joel Feinberg 22 all seem to dismiss it.
A statement by Regan sums up their collective attitude: "the tenuousness of the connection between the conduct and the harm gives
the argument something of the false ring of rationalization." 23
Overall, these major theorists of criminal law brush off the argument in a cursory way. None, it appears, believe that criminaliza-

19Donald Regan, Paternalism,Freedom, Identity, and Commitment, in PATERNALISM
113, 123 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983).
20 "Ultimately I am left with the feeling that these arguments either are not relevant to justifying restrictions on behavior . . . or, if they are relevant, do not seem
strong enough to tip the scale by themselves." Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism: Some
Second Thoughts, in PATERNALISM 105, 110 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983). In another place
he writes that the argument rests on "reasoning of a very dubious nature." Dworkin,
supra note 5, at 110.
21 He states that the argument evinces "considerable coyness," and shows "strenuous efforts" at justification. See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 135.
22Feinberg calls it "evasive," and labels the harm a "relatively remote and indirect
public harm[]." Id. at 141. He even seems to suggest that such an argument is so extreme that, if accepted, it swallows up the entire debate. Id. at 22 ("It must be a presupposition of the present discussion ... that there is no necessity that public harm
be caused.., whenever an individual deliberately injures himself or assumes a high
risk of so doing .... If this assumption is false, then there is no interesting problem
concerning legal paternalism, and certainly no practical legislative problem, since all
'paternalistic' restrictions, in that case, could be defended as necessary to protect
persons other than those restricted, and hence would not be (wholly) paternalistic.").
23 Donald Regan, Paternalism,Freedom, Identity, and Commitment, in PATERNALISM
113,123 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983).
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tion is the appropriate approach for rectifying this social problem.
In what follows, I pick up where they left off.

II. THE ARGUMENT
A. ACTUAL MANIFESTATIONS

1. Seatbelt Laws
Besides masturbation, perhaps no other "victimless crime" has
provoked more public discussion than the seatbelt laws. 24 Today,
mandatory use laws are the norm, and my own state survey has
shown that at least twenty-five states employ them. a5 While the first
justification for these laws was usually posited to be safety, at some
point their adherents were forced to come to terms with the individualistic current that pervades American political opinion: In the
"Land of the Free," how can an activity that ostensibly harms no
one but one's self be criminal? Weak, preliminary attempts were
made in the form of arguments about loss of vehicle control, but
eventually the tenuousness of this secondary justification made obvious that there was a primary concern lurking in the foreground:
26
the protection of the rider himself.
From here, there was only one way to proceed, only one way of
somehow implicating harm to others: taxpayer harm. At the time of
the Federal DOT regulation's promulgation, the counsel for
Reagan's Task Force for Regulatory Relief took pains to explain
how such an ostensibly paternalistic rule could be reconciled with

24 See generally Howard Leichter, Saving Lives and Protecting Liberty: A Comparative
Study of the Seat-Belt Debate, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 323, 329 (1986).
25See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.614 (2009); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 257.710(e) (2008);
MINN. STAT. § 169.686 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-76.2() (West 1973); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4513.263 (West 2011).
26 See Leichter, supra, note 24 at 337.
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the conservative agenda of the Task Force and of the Reagan Administration more generally. "[Failure to wear a seatbelt] isn't a
classic example of purely private behavior that has no external consequences," he explained, "[and] [t]he whole question of highway
accidents does put a very heavy burden on medical bills, which all
27
taxpayers have to pay."
Meanwhile, the States had their own constituencies to win over.
In the Texas legislature, the proponents of the criminalization of
seat belt omissions emphasized their impact upon the public treasury:
"Estimates are that nationwide about $57 billion in hospital
costs, work time lost, and other variables could be saved if
safety belts were used. Motorists in this state pay those bills
through steeper insurance rates and higher taxes, so it
would be in their interest to impose a direct incentive in the
form of a criminal fine [to use seatbelts]. . . . The higher insurance premiums and taxes required to pay for hospitals
and other facilities demonstrate that persons who insist on
the 'freedom' to die or be maimed also unavoidably affect
28
others."
Another state where the debate took on substantial proportions was
Illinois, and again this justification came up. Both from the legislative floor 29 and the governor's mansion, 0 taxpayer-harm arguments

27Kenneth B. Noble, The Politicsof Safety Has a Life of Its Own, N.Y.TIMES, July 15,
1984.
28H. STUDY GROUP B. ANALYSIS, SB 500, 69th Sess., at 13-14 (Tx. 1985).

29On the legislative floor, one representative argued that seatbelts "would clearly
save money," and that "it cost[s] the State over 800,000 dollars for a 26 year old person who is made a paraplegic as a result of a car crash." 83d ILL.GEN.ASSEM., House
Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton). Others
echoed this rationale. "We're not talking about somebody's own individual decision
to end up in a car crash and find him or herself in a hospital for 20 years with that
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were utilized, and when the law was ultimately challenged through
31
litigation, the state's supreme court endorsed the reasoning. Similarly, in Iowa, the state supreme court validated the taxpayer-harm
rationale used by that State's governor. 32 A more exhaustive search
would surely uncover similar statements in the dusty tomes of state
33
legislative history.
Alongside these judicial, legislative, and executive manifestations of the taxpayer-harm argument in the seatbelt context are
those advanced by academics. Most illustriously, Lawrence Tribe
wrote that in "a society unwilling to abandon bleeding bodies on
the highway, the motorcyclist or driver who endangers himself
plainly imposes costs on others." 34 A public health commentator

individual paying the bill. It's the taxpayers that are going to be paying those bills."
83d ILL.GEN.ASSEM., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 220 (statement of Representative Barbara Currie); 83d ILL.GEN.ASSEM., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 162
(statement of Senator Dawn Netsch) ("We intrude because the consequences of the
thousands of people.., who are injured and whose afflictions then are passed on to
their families, to all of us in society .... ").
30
Governor James R. Thompson said that the law will "save more than $400 million in costs." Letter from James R. Thompson, Governor of Illinois, to the General
Assembly (Jan. 8, 1985) (indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800), quoted in People v. Kohrig, 113 Ill.2d 384, 401-404 (1986).
31"[I]n the interest of general welfare, the police power... may be exercised to
protect the government itself against potential financial loss." People v. Kohrig, 498
N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (Ill. 1986) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
32The court cited with approval the governor's statement that "[iln addition to
saving lives and reducing the severity of traffic accidents, this legislation will also
save the motoring public, society, and state and local government millions of dollars." State v. Hartog, 440 N.W.2d 852, 853 (Iowa 1989) (upholding argument) (quoting Governor's Signing Statement at 859).
33Take, for example, Oregon. Cf. Leichter, supra, note 24 at 337 (quoting statement
by State Senator Roberts) ("We are saying that it is wrong to impose the penalties,
the unnecessary penalties, upon individuals, their families, and society, not only
because of the pain we suffer, but because of the economic effect we suffer.").
34 LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-12, at 1372 (2d ed.

1988).
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also weighed in and invoked the argument, 35 as well as a legal academic employing a law and economics approach. 36
2.

Motorcycle Helmet Laws

For whatever reason, the 1960's and 1970's were witness to a
proliferation of challenges to the helmet laws, and in almost all of
the cases the challenge was made based upon the limits of the police power. Because a valid exercise of the police power requires
some nexus to public interest,37 and the most obvious case of having
an interest in conduct is when it is harmful, the defenders of the
helmet laws were forced to rebut Harm-Principle-based objections,
and like with seatbelts, they resorted to taxpayer harm.
The most influential of all the helmet cases is Simon v. Sargent.38
While only a district court case, it was decided by a three-judge
panel (including a circuit judge), and was summarily affirmed by

35Responding to opponents' invocation of Mill's "Harm Principle" and the distinction between "other-regarding" and "self-regarding" behavior, Howard Leichter
replied "[flailure to use a seat belt is other-regarding in another sense: society must
pay for this imprudent behavior not only in loss of lives, but in loss of money as
well." Leichter, supra, note 24 at 337.
36Stephen Werber, as early as 1980, decried "the massive costs incurred by public
agencies involved in automobile accident situations (such as police, fire, and ambulance services, and the judiciary)." Stephen Werber, A Multi-DisplicinaryApproach to
Seat Belt Issues, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 217, 222 (1980). Applying a Calabresian law and
economics analysis, he argued that "[t]o ... make the economic benefits practical
instead of theoretical, a conmensurate duty must be imposed on the best cost avoider, the consumer." Id. at 224. Because the solution was so easy and cheap, and yet the
potential cost of non-use so great, he boldly concluded that "no reasonable economic
or legal argument can be raised to refute seat belt use legislation." Id. The value in
the mandatory use criminalization was "the deterrent effect of [a] liability rul[e]." Id.
He must have meant an "alienability" rule if he was discussing criminalization,
though.
37Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962).
m Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Mass. 1972), affd, 409 U.S. 1020
(1972).
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the Supreme Court. 39 Explicitly quoting On Liberty, the plaintiff argued that the limits of the police power mapped onto Mill's Harm
Principle. 40 The court declined to accept this, but noted that even
assuming the Harm Principle was binding law, the helmet crime
41
was still justified-"at least in present day society" :
"For while we agree with plaintiff that the act's only realistic purpose is the prevention of head injuries incurred in
motorcycle mishaps, we cannot agree that the consequences
of such injuries are limited to the individual who sustains
the injury .... From the moment of the injury, society picks
the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal
hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace
his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent disability,
may assume the responsibility for his and his family's continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind
that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is con42
cerned."
Even under the Harm Principle, then, the plaintiff should be convicted for failing to wear his helmet. The court could have ignored
the relevance of the Harm Principle, but instead confronted it on its
own ground, and did so with the taxpayer variant.
Another federal case that addressed the issue was Picou v. Gillum, an Eleventh Circuit decision written by retired Associate Justice Lewis Powell, sitting by designation. 43 Powell conceded that "a

39Id. Summary affirmance denotes a disposition on the merits of the case by the
Supreme Court. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
40Simon, 346 F. Supp. at 279.
41Id.
42Id.

43Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1519 (11th Cir. 1989).
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primary aim of the helmet law is prevention of unnecessary injury
to the cyclist himself," and then, in a classic taxpayer-harm movement, rejoined, "[but the costs of this injury may be borne by the
public."44 Because "governments provide police and ambulance
services," and because "the injured cyclist may be hospitalized at
public expense," Powell asserted, this personal injury is not merely
of personal concern. 45 Again, taxpayer harm results from ostensibly
46
self-regarding activity.
Decisions on the helmet issue proliferated in state high courts,
often invoking taxpayer-harm theories. In Colorado, the state supreme court wrote, "We would point out that this Court has held
that the police power relates not merely to the public health and
public physical safety, but also to public financial safety, and that
laws may be passed within the police power to protect the public
from financial loss." 47 Other states' high and intermediate appellate
courts have similarly advanced robust manifestations of the taxpayer-harm argument: Tennessee, 48 Utah, 49 Washington, 50 California, 51

44Id. at 1522.
45Id.
46Curiously, Powell then closes by explicitly referencing J.S. Mill and the Harm
Principle from On Liberty, but states that "the impressive pedigree of this political
ideal does not readily translate into a constitutional right." Id. After attempting to
work within the bounds of Mill's principle by advancing a theory of taxpayer harm,
he in the end demotes that same principle.
47Love v. Bell, 465 P.2d 118, 120 (Colo. 1970) (en banc).
4
8 Arutanoff v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 448 S.W.2d 408,410
(Tenn. 1969).
49"Both hospitals and relief rolls are crowded, and it is a proper exercise of police
power for the legislature to enact statutes which would tend to keep citizens out of
the one and off of the other." State v. Acker, 485 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Utah 1971).
50 "The legislature found that 'The costs of head injury treatment and rehabilitation are extensive and resultant disabilities are long and indeterminate. These costs
are often borne by public programs such as medicaid."' City of Bremerton v. Spears,
949 P.2d 347, 350 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 43.70.400). See
also State v. Laitinen, 459 P.2d 789, 791-92 (Wash. 1969) ("The greater the number of
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New York, 52 North Carolina, 53 New Hampshire,
58
57
Rhode Island, 56 Vermont, and Hawaii.
3.

54

Nebraska,

55

DangerousSports

The next area where the taxpayer-harm argument has surfaced
is in regulations surrounding dangerous or risky sports. These can
take the form of requirements regarding safety-enhancing instrumentalities (much like seatbelt and helmet laws in transportation),
or outright prohibition. While one could think of many examples of

serious injuries to the head and upper spine suffered by motorcycle riders, the greater the burdens it can reasonably be said are imposed on the publicly supplied or
regulated medical, hospital, ambulance and police services.").
51Buhl v. Hannigan, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1612, 1628 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
52See generally People v. Weber, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963 (N.Y. Town Ct. 1985).
53"Death on the highway can no longer be considered as a personal and individual tragedy alone." State v. Anderson, 164 S.E.2d 48, 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968), affd,
166 S.E.2d 49 (N.C. 1969).
5 State v. Merski, 307 A.2d 825, 826 (N.H. 1973) (supporting).
55Robotham v. State, 488 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Neb. 1992) (upholding argument).
56"We are not persuaded that the legislature is powerless to prohibit individuals
from pursuing a course of conduct which could conceivably result in their becoming
public charges." State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, 626 (RI. 1968).
57"Although plaintiffs argue that the only person affected by the failure to wear a
helmet is the operator of the motorcycle, the impact of that decision would be felt
Whether in taxes or insurance rates, our costs are
well beyond that individual ....
linked to the actions of others and are driven up when others fail to take preventive
steps that would minimize health care consumption." Benning v. State, 641 A.2d 757,
758 (Vt. 1994).
8 "There may be significant secondary harms to society as a whole which it is the
purpose of the statute to remedy and which, if realistic, bottom the statute in policies
which are constitutionally acceptable. .. [including] the 'public ward' theory, [that]
helmet laws, by limiting the extent of motorcycle injuries, curtail public expenditures
for emergency and hospital care for the cyclist and also minimize welfare costs resulting from the cyclist's post-accident inability to care for himself and his dependents." State v. Cotton, 516 P.2d 709, 709 (Haw. 1973).
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such laws 5 9 and could probably find evidence of the taxpayer-harm
argument working to justify them, only the most salient and common examples are highlighted below.
We can begin with a risky sport that is extremely popular in rural areas: hunting. It is now common that the failure of a hunter to
wear bright "hunter orange" is a criminal omission. 60 The increased
visibility cannot be meant to protect others: mistaking another
hunter for a wild animal has no impact upon the shooter's own
safety. To overcome this apparent limitation, and bring the statutes
more in line with predominating individualistic sentiments, one
must resort to taxpayer harm. Take, for example, an Ohio case, State
v. Bontrager, where an "Old Order Amish" man challenged the constitutionality of his conviction under the hunter-orange requirement
of the state, primarily based upon First Amendment grounds. 61 In
dismissing the case, the court noted that the regulation was within

-9 For example, in many States, divers are required to display a warning flag in
the area in which they will be submerged. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT § 75A-13.1 (2011);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-22-24 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3381 (1987). A recreational
activity called "teak surfing" (body surfing behind a boat by holding its stem board)
recently received legislative attention and was prohibited in certain states because of
its dangerousness. See CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 681 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 79A.60.660 (2006). Other examples abound. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-512 (2001)
(prohibiting certain type of bungee jumping); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5-19 (1998)
(skin diving in certain areas); MICH COMP. LAWS § 324.80198(b) (2007) (swimming
beyond the buoys); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.493(e) (1983) (jumping from bridges);
MINN. STAT. § 86B.601(4) (2005) (night diving with a spear); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF.
LAW § 37.09 (McKinney 1984) (performing on a trapeze or tightrope without certain
equipment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-25-210 (1976) (surfing in certain areas); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 50-25-310 (1976) (boating below a dam); S.C. CODE ANN. § 52-19-30 (1976)
(prohibiting certain type of bungee jumping); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 31-4-15.1 (1987)
(jumping from bridges); TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-2-106 (1974) (parachuting from airplanes).
60See, e.g., OH. Admin. CODE 1501:31-15-11 (2011).

61State v. Bontrager, 683 N.E.2d 126, 126 (Ohio Ct. App.1996).
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the State's police powers: "Overall, because of the impact serious
accidents have on public agencies, such as the cost of ambulances,
physicians, hospitals, and law enforcement personnel, the regulation validly attempted to improve the health, safety, and general
welfare of the state's residents." 62 Again, through the taxpayerharm rationale ostensibly private concerns become public.
Perhaps more risky than hunting are the practices of skydiving
and parachuting. Barring the possibility of striking a third party or
his property while landing, malfunctions and accidents that occur
when undertaking this activity would traditionally "harm" only the
parachutist himself. Again, though, legislation has been enacted to
restrict this activity, and in some cases it relies upon taxpayer-harm
theories. In Malone Parachute Club, Inc. v. Town of Malone, a local
government passed a law prohibiting the use of the municipal airport for parachuting activities unless a participant first obtained
personal liability insurance. 63 The club attacked this law in court as
unconstitutional, but the court noted with approval "the Town's
explanation that it cannot afford to bear the risk of liability created
by petitioner's activities." 64
Another potentially dangerous sport is boating and rafting, and
nearly ubiquitous is the requirement that personal flotation devices
be present or worn when engaging in the activity.65 Again, one can
imagine only the most tenuous hypothetical scenarios in which failure to wear a flotation device could somehow physically harm another person, and perhaps because of this, laws requiring their us-

62Id.

- 610 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687-88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
64Id. at 688. This case is slightly different in that the harm is created by personal
injury judgments against the government, and not by the provision of services, but
the underlying rationale is similar: taxpayer harm warrants criminalization.
65See e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-331 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 8-725
(West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 59-21-81 (2011).
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age have similarly been justified upon bases of taxpayer harm:
"Sen. Ferrioli said the bill will save lives, save taxpayer dollars, and
bolster law enforcement efforts on Oregon waters. " 66 The debate in
New York 67 and inNevada68 contains similar arguments.
4.

Mandatory Evacuations

Our final example is quite different from the first two. The
power to compel evacuations seems to inhere in the idea of "public
order;" a decision to disobey such an order looks like less of an isolated decision than a failure to buckle up. However, if we think critically about mandatory evacuations, the distinction between this
and other paternalistic laws becomes less salient. It is not hard to
imagine that a homeowner might, upon hearing the warnings, be so
adequately prepared for a disaster that his decision to leave or stay
has absolutely no impact upon anyone but himself, or in the alternative, that one might accept the risk and not ask for rescue, thus
incurring no costs. As in our other examples, the taxpayer-harm
argument comes in here usually as a makeweight, so as to dispel
any individualistic or civil-liberty-based objections that might be
raised. My own state survey finds twenty-eight states with mandatory evacuation, and one with a special option for voluntary evacu-

66Press Release, Oregon House Republicans, Senate Passes Rep. Huffman's Bill to
Increase
Safety
on
Oregon's
Rivers
(May
5,
2009),
http://www.leg.state.or.us/press-releases/hro-050509.html
67In the bill jacket accompanying a similar New York law, a legislator posits,
"[a]ny additional cost is obviously outweighed by the benefits to the public that will
result from these safety enhancements." Introducers Memorandum In Support, in
NY Bill Jacket, 2007 S.B. 4242, Ch. 320 (N.Y. 2007).
68The sponsor of the Nevada bill requiring flotation devices stated in committee,
"I'm here this afternoon in support of this bill. I think A.B. 112 represents an opportunity, at minor expense, to achieve some phenomenal cost benefits in terms of safety." COMM. ON NAT. REs., AG., & MINING, 73D SESS., NEV. ASSEM. COMM. MINS., at 19

(Mar. 14, 2005).
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ation.69 These are usually in the form of emergency grants of power
to the state's executive - only a few states (Utah, Texas, and Louisiana) have drawn their attention specifically to the issue of evacua7°
tion, and created more nuanced rules and penalties.
The state where evacuations have been most debated is Texas.
Following a series of hurricanes and other disasters, Texas enacted a
law allowing for the use of "reasonable force" in compelling citizens to evacuate should they refuse, and for the imposition of civil
liability for the costs of any later rescue. 71 The bill's sponsor, Senator
Carona (along with others), "argued that when residents who stay
need to be rescued, they not only cost taxpayers money, they endanger the lives of those who are required to rescue them." 72 The
argument behind giving evacuation orders the "teeth" to be truly
effective -"reasonable force" -was not really concern for the resident being evacuated, but that somehow his remaining in place
harms everyone else, through imperiling rescuers and costing taxpayers. Here, taxpayer-harm works in tandem with physical harm
to specific individuals. A nearly identical bill in Mississippi, allow-

69See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-925 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.100 (West
2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 401.309 (1997). The state where evacuation can be voluntary is
disaster-prone Louisiana, but provisions exist for compelled evacuation as well. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:730.3 (2008).
70
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:730.3 (2008); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.185 (West
2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-317 (West 2010).
71See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.185; see also Margaret Toal, Proposed Bill Would
Allow 'Force' in Storm Evacuation, Bills for Rescues, BEAUMONT ENTERPRISE, May 5,
2009,
http://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/Proposed-bill-wouldallow-force-in-storm-746317.php. Prior to this, local officials could give an order, but
there was no enforcement mechanism or even penalty. 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 766.
72See Sarah Moore, To Go or Not in Evacuation? Legislation Wrestles with Making
2009,
May
6,
Must,
BEAUMONT
ENTERPRISE,
Mandatory
a
http://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/To-go-or-not-in-evacuationLegislature-wrestles-745433.php.
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ing for "reasonable force" in evacuation, was proposed early in
2011, but seems unlikely to be successful. 73
Two federal cases also bring to light the presence of taxpayerharm arguments in the mandatory evacuation debate. The first,
Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, presents a fascinating
microcosm of a larger disaster scenario: a ship in peril at sea, the
Coast Guard ordering the crew to abandon it and its precious cargo,
with the Captain nevertheless hoping to remedy the mechanical
problems and ride out the storm. 74 The captain believed he could do
more to save his ship, but the Coast Guard officer threatened to use
physical force should he resist the evacuation order. 75 In affirming
the Coast Guard's immunity from suit for the loss, the First Circuit
mentions, almost in passing, "[i]f the ship had capsized, trapping
the men inside or putting them overboard, the Coast Guard would
"..."76
have been faced with a riskier, more costly rescue operation .
Yet again, it is increased cost that adds to the case for interference.
Cost supplements physical risk in the justificatory endeavor. While
admittedly in a context quite removed from mandatory evacuations- admiralty law-the Northern Voyager can be analogized to
any private, valuable home in the path of a hurricane or wildfire.
A second federal case more directly on point involved the
evacuation of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. In Reynolds v.

73H.B. 680, 2011 Leg., 126th Sess. (Miss. 2011).
74350 F.3d 247, 250 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Captain Haggerty opposed the Coast Guard's
decision to evacuate his vessel and wanted to talk about other options for pumping
and salvage, including commercial salvage. Dittes . . . refused to discuss any other
options for salvage aboard the NORTHERN VOYAGER, and, again, ordered
Haggerty and his men off the boat. According to Captain Haggerty, Conners informed him that if he did not cooperate, the Coast Guard would 'subdue [him] physically' in order to take him off the NORTHERN VOYAGER. All Coast Guard personnel and the remaining NORTHERN VOYAGER officers were then transferred to
the Coast Guard 47-footer.").
7 Id.
76Id. at 257 n.6.
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New Orleans City, residents were removed from their homes against
77
their will, and filed suit under various Constitutional theories.
Ironically, none of the plaintiffs' homes were ever damaged by the
flooding at all, and some of them had made significant preparations
so as to ride out the disaster without need for third party assistance. 78 Still, they were forced to leave by the National Guard (one
was even held at gunpoint and searched), and were unable to return to their homes for nearly a month. 79 The Fifth Circuit dismissed
80
the case without addressing the underlying questions very deeply.
What is important for our purposes is that the Court implicitly supported the mayor's evacuation order, and its text is revealing:
"Whereas the presence of individuals not specifically engaged ... to
assist in the remediation and recovery effort would distract, impede, or divert essential resources from the recovery effort," he
wrote, "I... do hereby promulgate and issue the following mandatory evacuation order." 81 Nothing is said about the evacuee's personal safety or well-being, and the argument is reframed into one of
taxpayer harm: remaining would "divert essential resources."
B.

THE ARGUMENT DISTILLED & CLASSIFIED

After synthesizing all of the above, the taxpayer-harm argument can be laid out more abstractly:

77272 Fed. App'x 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2008).
7
8Id.
79Id. at 339-40.

80For example, the Substantive Due Process challenge to the order was held to be
moot, as the evacuation order itself had since been lifted. Id. The Fourth Amendment
claim was dismissed because no municipal "custom or policy" could be established,
as required by §1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs,, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
81 See id.
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1. A State's police power extends at least as far as is necessary to protect the public from harm, and police power contains the power to criminalize.
2. Conduct that creates the necessity of governmental service provision depletes the public treasury, causing harm to
all taxpayers.
3. Therefore, taxpayer-harming conduct may be criminalized.
A few general comments are in order. The taxpayer-harm
argument is, at bottom, an attempt to justify paternalistic
safety regulations using a classically liberal makeweight:
the Harm Principle. But for the taxpayer-harm theory, these
laws would otherwise be called in Feinbergian terminology
"legal paternalism" of the "benevolent" and "hard" species - that is, they seek to prevent harm to the actor himself,
for his own good, when he has no informational or rational
deficiencies. 82 Moreover, they are "one-party" cases that
need no extra actor for the infliction of the harm to self, and
most often are "active" in that they require certain steps be

82 See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 4, 5, 12. The major theorists have shown some reluctance in admitting that this is "hard" and not "soft" paternalism. Gerald Dworkin
believes that in the case of helmet laws, no one with the correct information would
choose not to wear them. Dworkin, supra, note 20 at 109. In my estimation, this is an
easy case of hard paternalism: actors have merely rationally weighed the magnitude
of the risk with that of the annoyance of the safety measure.
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taken to mitigate or prevent harm (thus, punishing omis83
sions).
The taxpayer-harm argument, though, removes these cases from
this schema. It is not merely a shift from benevolent to nonbenevolent paternalism- constraining of liberty for the sake of a
larger project84 - but an attempt to escape the parameters of paternalism altogether: prohibition is justified because of harm to others.
The argument allows for the expansion of human vulnerability to
harm, locking all members of the polity in a common undertaking
of harm or benefit. This harm is an economic harm, and it is diffuse- everyone else is a victim. However, it also relies on aggregation
85
of perpetrators to rise above the objection of triviality. Finally, it is
important to remember that the vast majority of the taxpayer-harm
86
statutes punish endangermentand not just results.
III. THE ARGUMENT EVALUATED

Before testing the taxpayer harm argument using a criminalization framework, it is worth saying just a brief word about the political theory that underlies it. It was observed that this argument is an
attempt to satisfy the demands of classical liberals and retributivists, both of whom look for "harm to others" when proscribing con-

83See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 8, 9. It should be noted that the traditional, 18th
Century Harm Principle did not allow for the punishment of omissions. See Epstein,
supra note 10, at 395-96.
84Feinberg uses the example of paternalism in prisons, armies, and athletic teams.
Personal liberty is constrained so as to benefit a larger goal. A "demeaning spirit"
pervades these regimes of authority. Feinberg, supra note 4, at 5.
15Feinberg, supra note 7, at 193.
86This is consistent with the Harm Principle. "Since the Harm Principle posits the
prevention of harm as the proper aim of the criminal law, it sanctions the criminalization of dangerous as well as actually harmful conduct." R.A. Duff, Harms and
Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 13, 44 n.14 (2001).
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duct. Conclusion (3) above follows from an acceptance of the liberal
conceptual restraint of Premise (1). However, the crucial intermediate premise is not conceptual, but empirical -or, so it is presupposed to be by those who advocate for taxpayer harm criminalization. But is Premise (2)- the reality of government cost creation purely an empirical observation, analogous to a brute fact?
If we investigate it more carefully, it becomes obvious that it is not:
normative commitments, not any ineluctable aspects of reality, are
ultimately the causes of that supposedly "empirical" fact. These
normative commitments flow from a version of the distributive justice theory that undergirds much of the modern welfare state. In
other words, the only reason that what is normally self-regarding
conduct becomes other-regarding is because our society has taken it
upon itself to cover the costs. 87 The motorist who incurs governmental cost does so only because we have chosen to support him.
All this is well and good (after all, most allegedly "empirical" phenomena in the political realm have some normative roots).
What is strange, though, is that this normative commitment is decidedly non-liberal. In fact, it is antithetical to liberalism-it is paternalistic in its concern for those who cannot take care of themselves.
Thus, the taxpayer harm argument for government regulation of
conduct is structured along liberal parameters (harm to others), but
relies upon a crucial premise that is itself paternalistic. At the very
least, this is paradoxical; at worst, it might reveal incoherence.
Political theory is not the subject of this Article, though, and our
primary concern is the argument's comportment with the substantive requirements for criminalization. It is axiomatic in punishment
theory that at least two good reasons can be advanced for punitive

87Note, the same point has been made in economics literature touching on taxpaying externalities: the externalities come not from the conduct itself, but instead
from the decision to publicly subsidize the costs of the conduct. See generally Edgar
K. Browning, The Myth of Fiscal Externalities,27 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW 3 (1999).
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sanctions and criminalization: deterrence and retribution.8 8 Taxpayer harm is easily cognizable under a deterrence-based theory, as its
primary goal, after all, is to provide incentives for individuals to act
in a manner that is most efficient for society and for the state. Under
this theory, legislators have laudably calculated the costs of the
conduct to society, weighed them against the benefits of the enjoined safety measures, and concluded that a criminal sanction is
the most effective tool to persuade individuals to adopt their utilitymaximizing conclusions. Think of the law and economics argument
for seatbelts: a deterrent in the form of a criminal sanction places
the burden on the least cost avoider.8 9 However, for those who believe that retribution must play at least some role in the decision to
criminalize (this is easily the majority position),9 0 taxpayer harm has
a far tougher row to hoe. In what follows, I will analyze how well
the argument can stand up against the traditional demands of this
theory: the existence of a harmful wrong that is of public concern. It
is important to remember, as we proceed, that these critiques are
aimed solely at the taxpayer-harm argument, and not at the laws
themselves, more generally (which could have multiple or alternative justifications). While, in practice, the argument has taken on the
form of a makeweight, buttressing paternalistic concern over the
intrinsic value of human life, it needs to be analyzed in isolation any justificatory foundation must stand or fall on its own.

8 See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3,5 (1955)
89See generally Werber, supra note 36.
90Husak's recent assessment of the law and economics literature on crime shows
that this movement, and its deterrence-theory manifestation, "has made almost no
contributions in the criminal domain." DOUGLAS Husak, OVERCRIMINALIZATION 180
(Oxford: OUP, 2008). See also GEORGE FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 59

n.140 (New York: OUP, 2007) (Leading law and economics theorists have "nothing to
say about substantive criminal law").
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THEORETICAL COHERENCE

There are enduring, commonly shared lineaments of a retribufive theory of criminal law that can help us to assess our argument.
First is the element of "harm." While some argue that harm is, or
should be, absolutely necessary for an act or omission to be criminalized, 91 we can take, with Feinberg, a more philosophically cautious
approach -the causation of harm is always at least a good reason for
criminalization. 92 But a great majority of human actions somehow
set back the interests of others, 93 and therefore the criminal law
needs additional requirements. This is why most theorists (and
traditional doctrine) believe that more than mere harm is required,
and demand that harms also be wrongfully inflicted. 94 Thus, harms
and wrongs have distinctive meanings, and only when a harm violates a right in a blameworthy way is it also a wrong.95 While some
theorists would look solely to wrongfulness when determining

91This was Mill's position, and that of most libertarians. See Heidi M. Hurd, What
in the World Is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 157 (1994). Hurd reads Mill as admitting that there can be harmless "wrongs," but that this category of actions does
not deserve state punishment. Id. at 215.
92Mill said harm is the only reason to interfere with liberty, while Feinberg says it
is just a "good reason." Feinberg, supra note 7, at 12.
93See generally Ronald Coase, The Problemof Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
94Hurd, supra note 91, at 210; Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a
Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1533, 1537 (1997).
95See Hurd, supra note 91, at 214 (arguing that it is really wrongs and not harms
that justify criminalization) ("While the category of wrongs may well be dominated
by actions that unjustifiably cause harm, it is not exhausted by such actions... because
many actions that cause harm are justified... [and] many actions that are morally
wrong and criminally prohibited do not cause harm."). On the distinction between
harms and wrongs, see R.A. Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 13, 17-18
(2001) ("On the one hand, wrongs are not in themselves harms, though they typically
cause harm, since they typically involve an invasion of, and a setback to, the
wronged person's interests."). I adopt Hurd's taxonomy. Hurd, supra note 91, at 211.
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criminalization, 96 we will simply add it as another criterion. Still,
though, there is another factor, as there is a vast body of harmful
wrongs that the criminal law does not concern itself with (contract
breaches are the best example). The final criterion to add is that
which makes a harmful wrong distinctly criminal: its public nature. 97 Altogether, these make up the major features of what criminal conduct should implicate: a wrongful harm that concerns the
98
public.
1. Harmfulness
The most influential understanding of harm (advanced by Joel
Feinberg) is "harm conceived as the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest," with an interest meaning having a "stake in
[something's] well-being." 99 It seems clear that the causation of an
aggravated financial expenditure 00 by a victim would constitute a
setback to the victim's interests, but who is the true victim in the

96Hurd, supra note 91, at 214.
97Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 967,

971 (1943).
98"To show that it should even in principle be criminalized, we would need to
show that it is: (1) a matter that should concern the law at all, rather than being a
purely private matter to be dealt with by those involved; and (2) that it should be a
matter for the criminal law, rather than for the civil law .... This would involve
showing that the conduct in question is not just (potentially) harmful, but wrong,
and that the wrong is a 'public' wrong that merits recognition and condemnation by
R. A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, 65 LA. L. REV. 941, 952-53
the polity .
(2005).
99Feinberg, supra note 7, at 33. Of course there are other formulations; the concept
is inherently ambiguous. See E.M. SCHUR & H.A. BEDAU, VICTIMLESS CRIMES 77 (Prentice Hall ed., 1974).
100A paradox of many safety measures is that they might increase costs by prolonging life just enough for the provision of costly medical care, as opposed to permitting quick death, which, unfortunately, is far cheaper. Dworkin, supra note 20, at
109.
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taxpayer-harm argument? Is it that the State's interests are set back,
or those of the taxpayers, merely filtered intermediately through the
State? Because the nature of the victim will determine the nature of
its interests, and because something must possess an interest to
have that interest set back, this is important.
It seems unlikely that the State governing apparatus is itself the
"victim," or that it can possess its own interests cognizable by the
criminal law. Feinberg writes of "governmental interests" that are
directly correlated with state functions. 101 "Governmental interests
are 'those generated in the very activities of governing,' such as collecting taxes, registering aliens, conscripting an army...," he states,
and they are violated by "impersonal crimes" like tax fraud, contempt of court, failure to register, bribery of officials, escaping from
prison, etc. 102 However, he notes that these "governmental interests
...in the last analysis belong to individual citizens," although they
"may be highly dilute." 10 3 In committing these offenses, no single
victim is directly harmed, but were they to become widespread,
they would undermine the stability of government to the point at
which it would directly affect the individual citizen: the system
would break down.10 According to this exposition, our taxpayers
themselves must be the victims, as even with setbacks to "governmental interests," the government is merely an intermediary
whereby the harm is diffused. With Feinberg, I agree that we must
be somewhat reductionist when ascertaining what interests are
cognizable by the criminal law: there can be no State "interests" that

101Feinberg, supra note 7, at 63
102Id.
03

1

Id.

104A

violation "endangers the operation of government systems in whose efficient

normal functioning we all have a stake." Id. at 64.
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make sense in a retributivist framework when totally unmoored
105
from any impact upon natural persons.
But what "government interest" does taxpayer harm set back
that then cascades down to the citizens as harm? Feinberg's examples, and his explanation of how the admittedly "impersonal"
crimes harm the citizens, do not relate to expenditure or fiscal concerns, but to a respect for the rule of law -they are about obedience
of rules that, if disobeyed, flout the authority and the legitimacy of
the State as legal sovereign. The most pecuniary of all -tax evasion -sets back the "government interest" not by causing others to
shoulder more of the burden, but because it evinces disrespect for
the duties one owes to one's nation. All of these "impersonal
crimes," if ubiquitous, would result in a reversion to anarchy- they
threaten the very existence of the State. What does taxpayer harm
threaten, though? It only threatens the State with having to perform
more of its functions, and spend more resources. The "government
interest" is an interest in the perpetuity of the rule of law; requiring
government to spend more does not implicate this. Whatever interest taxpayer harm can be said to set back, it is not a legally cognizable "government interest."
Perhaps we could look at the taxpayer more individually, and
ignore the intermediary: are his individual financial interests set
back, even if his governmental interests are not? With payment of
taxes, the difficulty (perhaps even impossibility) is drawing a line
precisely where the individual's interests stop being advanced and
start being set back. It is of course in the taxpayer's interests to pay

105See MARKUS D. DUBBER, VIcriMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
VICrIMS' RIGHTS 116 (2006) (describing difficulties with viewing the State as a victim,
in that "The state is apersonal because it ostensibly, and simply, manifests the interests of the community it governs. It is a bureaucratic institution with no identity and
no function, except the maintenance of 'public welfare' through the protection of
'social interests."').
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taxes generally, because he benefits from the existence of the State;
only an anarchist would controvert this. Can he pay too much,
though, and begin to face diminishing returns? The problem with
this cost-benefit analysis is that it ignores the multitude of intangible, incalculable benefits that the taxpayer receives from the preservation of a functioning government. Just because he does not directly receive goods or services of monetary value does not mean that
he is literally wasting his taxes, getting nothing in return. The
State's mere existence as a framework for enabling the pursuit of
"ordered liberty" 106 is the overall benefit the taxpayer receives. The
preservation of public order and stable markets are two elements of
this, but so also is the social "safety net," even should he never need
to use it himself (climbers do not see their safety nets as wasted
simply because they never fall). It is only at an extreme point that
the payment of taxes becomes obviously prejudicial to the taxpayer's interests. Confiscatory taxation for the pleasures of a dictator
might implicate this harm; there, what would be naked theft is
clothed by color of law. Here, though, our aggravated taxation is
used for more governing. More rescue efforts, more welfare, more
healthcare. The only way that the argument might possibly survive
is to craft a taxpayer interest in paying as little tax money as is necessary for the preservation of this government framework. But this
is really an empty proposition: in providing the services that the
State has deemed to be its essential functions-the pillars of its
framework - it is inherently acting only out of necessity.
Looking directly at the individual taxpayer as the victim of taxpayer-harming conduct raises another issue: de minimis effects. De
minimis has long been a defense in the criminal law, and is incorporated by the Model Penal Code. 107 In writing on the variable of

106This term is from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
107 MODEL

PENAL CODE

§ 2.12.
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harm's "magnitude," Feinberg states, "[a]s the venerable legal maxim has it, de minimis non curat lex ('The law does not concern itself
with trifles')." 10 8 Even were a reckless boater to require a great deal
of medical care, the impact upon an individual taxpayer of that one
boater's care is so small as to be negligible. Taxpayer harm only rises above the level of a trivial offense by aggregating victims and
offenders, which is problematic in criminal law. 109
A related difficulty is the universality of criminalization, which
paints with such broad strokes that many harmless or even beneficial acts might be proscribed. 110 Some interests may be set back, but
there might be a net gain being ignored. For example, imagine a
blanket prohibition on skydiving or scuba diving (activities that,
while quite dangerous, bring great enjoyment to those who safely
engage in them). Richard Epstein wrote of such skewed harmbenefit analyses in his own article on the Harm Principle: "The current view sees externalities everywhere. In effect it isolates one negative consequence of any action on third parties and uses it to justify
prohibition of that action.., no matter how large the gains for others.""1 In short, the good is thrown out with the bad, even when the
former outweighs the latter. The argument makes less sense when
thinking of somewhat valueless activities" 2 such as seat belt omissions, but Epstein's point is well taken in other areas.

108Feinberg, supra note 7, at 189.

109
Id. at 225.
"Specific instances of generally harmful activities are sometimes themselves
110
quite harmless .... In these cases a blanket prohibition will (probably) diminish or
eliminate the general harm but only at the cost of preventing the harmless or beneficial instances too." Id. at 193.
Epstein, supra note 10, at 417. He goes on to say, "lt]his skewed form of social
111
accounting has a predictable, if perverse, result: every action generates some harm
under the expanded harm principle." Id.
112Feinberg writes, beyond magnitude and probability of harm, there is the "crucial third factor [which] is the independent value of the risk-creating conduct both to
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To repeat, taxpayer-harming conduct, being concerned solely
with financial expenditure for essential government services, cannot be
said to set back a taxpayer's "governmental interest," nor are the
taxpayer's individual financial interests set back, as there can be no
intelligible line drawn beyond which the financial support of the
governmental structure becomes inimical to that taxpayer's interests. Additionally, problems of de minimis effects and suppression of
valuable activities arise. Overall, it is hard to see this conduct as
"harmful."
2.

Wrongfulness

Our next criterion of analysis is wrongfulness; it is the unabashedly (im)moral aspect of a crime.11 3 Feinberg writes that a wrong is
a harm that is unjustly inflicted (it violates a victim's right), and is
perpetrated with a blameworthy mental state.114 This only begs further questions, though, of the content of those two sets: rights and
mental states. In proceeding we take for granted, of course, that
mere violation of the law cannot alone make conduct wrongful.115

the actor himself, to others directly affected by it, and to society in general." Feinberg, supra note 7, at 191. Cf.Dworkin, supra note 5,at 125.
113 As we have alluded to, taxpayer harm is unproblematic under a consequentialist ethic (where what is "wrong" is what is costly or not useful)- especially when
the value being maximized is social utility. In addressing this issue, though, we continue to use a retributive, deontological framework, where the conduct takes on a
different character.
114
Feinberg, supra note 7 at 108, 109, 114.
115This would make the discussion rather brief indeed, but such a position represents one side of a debate that goes far deeper than criminal law, and extends into
jurisprudence and political philosophy. See generally THE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW:
SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS (Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield, 1999). This debate
makes its way into the criminal law most saliently when the topic of mala prohibitais
being addressed. See generally Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a
Mattress: Overcriminalizationand the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1533 (1997) (giving a good discussion of the parameters of the debate, and offering a specific defense of mala prohibitacrimes).
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For our purposes, the issue of rights is an easy one. Do the taxpayers have a right not to pay higher taxes? We begin by noting
that the State has a duty to provide the services that it assumes as
its essential functions, and to do so for all people. To hold otherwise
would be to revert to what Nozick called the "ultra-minimal state,"
where even policing and protection from attack are provided only
to those who pay. 1 6 If the provision of these services is part of the
duties of the state, part of its essential function and raison d'itre,
then the payment of taxes is similarly a duty. In Hohfeldian terminology, if the taxpayers have a "duty" to pay, they cannot simultaneously possess the jural opposite-a "privilege" to not pay. 117 In
fact, someone else holds a correlative right to receive the services
whose funding is the duty of the taxpayers. 118 The citizen qua taxpayer has a duty, but citizen qua service-beneficiary has a right, or a
claim. The citizen's right, then, is to receive, and not to escape payment. If payment of taxes is a duty, it follows that the non-payment
of taxes cannot be a right, and therefore taxpayer harm incursion
violates no right, and is no "wrong." 119

116

ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974).

117See

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in

Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-32 (1913); see also Joseph William Singer, The
Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L.
REV. 975, 986-87 (1982).
118See Hohfeld, supra note 1177, at 30-32.
119
It may seem that I am committing an error by appealing to a schizophrenic understanding of rights and duties-that, in seeking to critique a perversion of the
Harm Principle in the name of a more robust preservation of individual liberty, I
have invoked rights and duties that only make sense within a more substantial vision of community relationships which is antithetical to that individualism. However, the two duties that are crucial to vitiating taxpayer harm are basic, and inhere in
nearly every conception of the State, both minimal and expansive: (1) the duty of the
State to provide its essential services to all of its citizens free of charge (and the citizen's correlative right to receive them), and (2) the duty of the citizen to pay taxes so
as to support that State. What differentiates the minimal state from a modem distributivist state is not any change in these two fundamental demands, but in what
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What of Feinberg's second element of a wrong: a perpetrator's
blameworthy mental state? None of the statutes we have surveyed
contain the explicit result element of pecuniary harm to the taxpayers (as does a typical homicide statute with the result of death) this harm is a background motivation, not a statutory element. Because of this, it is doctrinally correct to say that taxpayer harm perpetrators possess a blameworthy mental state with respect to their
conduct. In short, there is no mens rea problem. However, if we go
beyond doctrine and inquire into what wrongfulness means on a
more theoretical level, we might ask whether or not their mental
state is at all tied to the interests being sought to be protected -here,
120
financial well-being.
Because taxpayer-harming conduct almost always requires an
injury to the perpetrator, it is highly unlikely that that perpetrator's
mental state with respect to the financial harm is ever intentional:
few are the drivers who fail to buckle up with the conscious objective of incurring government costs. At most, given their general
awareness of the government's obligations, taxpayer-harm perpetrators have a reckless mental state with respect to the ultimate interest: they consciously take a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
creating the detrimental financial effect. 121 This will not always be
true, though, if the actor has taken proper precautions (e.g. the motorist who has his own insurance, or the resident who has prepared
his home for disaster). This person does not act recklessly at all. "l 2

each chooses to take on as its essential services -how it chooses to spend its tax
money, essentially.
120In his discussion of wrongs, Feinberg posits that the injustice, the wrong, occurs when the culpable mental state is related to "an adverse effect on [the victim's]
interests." See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 107.
121See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(C) (defining recklessness).
122See, e.g., Arkansas man saves home from risingfloodwaters by building epic levee and
MOAT

around

his

property,

DAILY

MAIL

(May

14,

2011),
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Even granting that recklessness is present, this is problematic and
somewhat novel given the following observation from Heidi Hurd:
Criminal law does not make criminal any and all negligent
and reckless actions; it makes criminal only negligent and
reckless actions that risk a special set of interests. Thus, it
embodies prohibitions against reckless endangerment and
negligent homicide that protect the interest in life and limb,
and in some jurisdictions it embodies a prohibition against
negligent rape that protects the interest in sexual autonomy
and bodily integrity. 123
A survey of the generalized "reckless endangerment" statutes reveals that all of them require that the risk be correlated to "death or
serious bodily injury." 124 Only one state criminalizes recklessness
with respect to the endangerment of property. 125 Such an observation about the traditional ends of recklessness statutes ought to at
least give the legislator pause in the case of taxpayer harm. Recklessness with respect to another's life and limb certainly seems to be
an instance where unintentional conduct may be criminalized, but
recklessness with respect to financial well-being -does this rise to
the same level of wrongfulness? 126 Yet again, the taxpayer-harm

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1387110/DeValls-Bluff-Arkansas-manRussell-Petty-saves-home-flooding-building-levee-MOAT.html.
123
Hurd, supra note 91 at 198. As she writes elsewhere, the requirement that recklessness be related to endangerment of life and limb "finds doctrinal expression in the
criminal law." Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 261
(1996).
124See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-207 (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2705 (2011);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103 (2011); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 31-625 (2011); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 211.2.

125N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.25 (McKinney 2011).
126
Overcriminalization theorists have understood the explosion in the number of
"risk-prevention" statutes to be one of the phenomenon's primary causes. Husak
writes, "there is virtually no limit to how far the state might go in protecting persons
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argument introduces a novelty to the criminal law, and such novelty makes it presumptively suspect.
Even ignoring the problem inherent in recklessness, we are confronted with the more abstract question: how can any mental state
with respect to the State's financial well-being alter the State and
taxpayer duty to provide the service -in other words, how can it be
that one element of wrongfulness, the mental state, somehow
changes the other, which is the right-invasion. 127 Examples abound
showing that such a distinction does not exist in the areas of Stateprovided services, 128 and that the drawing of it would lead to absurdities. Take public education, for example: here, the family that
has a large number of children knowingly puts a greater strain upon the public school system, and so does the young adult that
chooses a State university over a private one. Of course, these activities are not criminalized, despite the mental state associated with
their aggravation of government expenditure. While few would
purposively increase taxpayer costs, it is obvious from our examples
that a great deal of conduct takes place in which the actor knowingly
aggravates expenditure, and sometimes in neutral or beneficial activity. It cannot be, then, that a less culpable mental state -our tax-

from novel ways that harm might be risked." Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the
Core, 39 TULSA L. REV. 755, 771 (2004).
127 It must be noted that the Supreme Court has held that, "[als a general matter, a
State is under no [federal] constitutionalduty to provide substantive services for those
within its border." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (emphasis added).
The duties we speak of here have either been assumed voluntarily by the State, are
required by the State constitution, or inhere in the notion of a political community
more generally - they are not grounded in the United States Constitution.
128 With transportation, those who use the roads more frequently also increase the
maintenance costs associated with them. In public safety, the victim who intentionally resists a robbery greatly increases the chance of a public disturbance through the
escalation, and therefore increases policing costs. Those who choose to live in a highcrime area, or those who wear flashy clothing and drive expensive cars, can both be
said to risk the same.
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payer-harm recklessness - can possibly suffice to change the character of conduct so as to demand criminal liability. Most services, it
seems, we just expect the State (through its taxpayers) to pay for
without consideration of how the cost arises, and the recipient's
state of mind is totally irrelevant. 129 By attempting to carve out an
area where this expectation is diminished, the taxpayer-harm argument creates an inconsistency in the law, but without an adequate explanation.
To sum up, the taxpayer has no right to withhold his taxes
when they are being expended upon what the government has
deemed to be its essential services, and the perpetrator's merely
reckless mental state with respect to the infliction of financial burdens (if it exists at all) seems insufficient, and cannot somehow alter
the boundaries of the aforementioned right: this conduct is not
"wrongful."
3.

Public Character

The final requirement for criminality, public character, is the
most complex. The idea has an impressive intellectual pedigree Blackstone noted long ago that while crimes "strike at the very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist where actions of this
sort are suffered to escape with impunity," civil wrongs are "imma-

129

This is probably because the very purpose of the State, and the justification for
the provision of most of the "services" we have discussed so much, is precisely to
remedy individuals' deficiencies. I am referring to the notion of the collective action
problem, which is itself created by certain features of human nature. See JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 231-32 (Oxford ed., 1980) (concluding also that
"co-ordination" problems give rise to the need for common authority as well); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 267-70 (Harvard ed., 1971). Because the very purpose of
the State is somehow bound up with human deficiency and comes about as an albeit
imperfect solution to that problem, it makes sense that the execution and provision
of essential State functions-the instruments of that solution-do not require their
recipients to be perfect or even innocent.
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terial to the public."130 Various theoretical approaches can help to
articulate what is meant by a "public" harmful wrong.
One approach, advanced most notably by Nozick and Becker,
emphasizes the harmfulness aspect, and attempts to understand
how this can be cognizable at a public level. Nozick highlights the
generalized fear that is created by a crime, no matter how particularized the victim, and sees this as what "publicizes" the act and its
effect. 131 In Becker's theory, it is "the potential for destructive disturbance of fundamental social structures" that is the harmful public effect of a crime-the "social volatility" that is created leads to
citizens' anxiety that they might need to resort to anti-social behavior out of self-defense. 132 Crimes inject a tenor of Hobbesian preoccupation with the possibility of bellum omnium contra omnes. Under
both theories, crime is much like the invasions of "government interest" described by Feinberg: it is inimical to public order.
A second approach, notably proposed by communitarians Marshall and Duff, emphasizes the wrongfulness aspect in making
crime public. 133 "The point is not just that we realise that other

1304 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*4;see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
*2; Grant Lamond, What Is A Crime?, 27 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 609,
614-15 (2007) ("The most influential approach to understanding the nature of crimes
has been in terms of their being public, as opposed to private, wrongs. The conception of crimes as 'public' has a long tradition in common law thought. Crimes were
regarded as violations of the King's Peace, and, as such, were liable to being pursued
as pleas of the crown. In its modern incarnation, the place of the sovereign as the
embodiment of the public is taken by the community, which is regarded as affected
by crimes in a way that it is not by civil law wrongs, thus making it the appropriate
body to pursue such wrongs.").
131Nozick, supra note 116, at 65-71; see Lamond, supra note 130, at 615.
132Lawrence C. Becker, Criminal Attempts and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3
COMMENTARIES

PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 262, 273 (1974); Lamond, supra note 130, at 615.
133See S.E. Marshall & R.A. Duff, Criminalizationand SharingWrongs, 11 CAN. J. OF
L. AND

JURISPRUDENCE

R.A.DUFF, ANSWERING

7, 20 (1998). An elaboration of Duff's position is presented in
FOR CRIME 140 (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
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members of the group are also vulnerable to such attacks," they
argue, "or that we want to warn other potential assailants that they
cannot attack members of the group with impunity... : it is that the
attack on this individual victim is itself also an attack on us - on her
as a member of the group and on us as fellow members." 134 Such a
theory relies upon a robust conception of community. When a
community is "united by mutual concern, by genuinely
shared... values and interests, and by the shared recognition that its
members' goods... are bound up with their membership of the
community," groups can "share the wrongs done to its individual
35
members."1
Feinberg also notes other possible manners of understanding
wrongful harms as "public." Beyond the "government interest"
discussed earlier, he notes that if "a collection of specific interests
of the same kind [is] possessed by a large and indefinite number of
private individuals," this could be public harm. 136 His example is
that of a bomb in a transit station -the point is that certain danger137
ous activities "threaten[] no specific person namable in advance."
Another possibility is that of a "'common,' or widely shared, specific interest": all people have an interest in one definable thing,
138
such as continuance of government or economic prosperity.
How can our argument fare under these frameworks of analysis? We can incorporate the discussion of "government interests"
here, and conclude immediately that taxpayer harm is not "public"
under Becker or Nozick's theories. It does not implicate the existence and legitimacy of the rule of law and the State, nor does it create any fear. What of Marshall and Duff? Here, taxpayer harm

13 Id. at 20.
135 Id.
136Feinberg,

supra note 7, at 222-23.

137Id.
138Id.
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might have some more traction as a reckless wrong imposed upon
the community in general: an attack on the goods, values, and interests of the public. But it seems unlikely that such a morally animated theory can permit the sterile, fiscally oriented conduct of
taxpayer harm to be imbued with a public quality -also, the conception of "community" is not very strong if costs are construed as
"harm" when expended to save others from themselves. Even under Feinberg's formulations, the argument is unable to make
headway. The public-because-dangerous-to-random-individuals
theory (subway station bomb) seems blatantly inapposite; the
"common[ly]" shared "specific interest" is probably the only way
to proceed. But this would also likely be our "government interests" discussed in the "harm" section, and therefore fails for the
same reasons Becker's theory does.
Even were we to grant that some narrower, fiscal version of
.government interests" is implicated by taxpayer harm-one that
does not implicate the rule of law or continuity of government-I
would be skeptical that these interests are in fact public. The problem is that this vision of fiscal governmental interests -interests
that can somehow be set back by the provision of its essential services- relies on a very thin conception of the State as somewhat
like a corporation. Such a conception is necessary in order to overcome the objections stated in the past two sections, and make taxpayer-harming conduct cognizable as a harmful wrong, but it ironically narrows the scope of that harmful wrong's effects. If pecuniary loss is the sole issue, and not some larger understanding of
governmental interest, then only those who gain and lose monetarily because of that loss are truly affected by the conduct. However,
as is known all too well, the sets of "public" and "taxpayer" are not
entirely coterminous- not even mostly. It is widely reported that
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nearly half of Americans do not pay Federal income tax, 139 and the
non-paying percentage is likely to be high in the individual states
as well. Thus, taxpayer-harming activity is still not truly "public,"
but is precisely what it says it is - a harmful wrong to taxpayers.
Taxpayer harm arguments uncritically assume the public nature of
the harmful wrong because of the entity that is wronged, but proceed to specify that harmful wrong in such a way that the scope of
those who can be affected is narrowed. Narrowed, I think, to the
point that it is no longer of "public" concern. When we realize that
taxpayer-harming conduct really only "harms" (and wrongs) a
subset of the "public," the entire edifice smacks more of a private
140
dispute between a corporation and an individual.
All of the taxpayer-harm arguments surveyed in our first section seemed to take for granted that if an activity depletes the public
treasury, it is of course wrongfully harming (or risking harm to) the
"public," but under all of the prevalent theories, the "public" quality of the conduct is of dubious validity. As Feinberg warns, "[t]he
harms produced by [impersonal] crimes can be labeled 'public' as
opposed to 'private' harms provided it is kept in mind that the public is composed of private individuals standing in complex social
and legal relations to one another." 141 A good way of summing up
the previous discussion is to conclude that the taxpayer-harm argument, for all its common-sense vigor, fails to appreciate the

139
See Rachel Johnson et. al., Why Some Tax Units Pay No Income Tax, TAX POLICY
CTR. 1-2 (July 27, 2011), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001547-Why-NoIncome-Tax.pdf.
140This is especially true of the massive nations of today, where even an additional detriment to the taxpayers may be completely unfelt by the rest. It is theoretically
possible, though, that a community might be so small that any harm felt by the taxpayers is concomitantly felt by the non-payers. See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 23 ("The
closer any society is to what we might call 'the garrison threshold,' the more the
harm principle comes into play ....). The smaller the community, the more we feel
the effects of harm on others.
141Feinberg, supra note 7, at 11.
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"complex[ity]" noted by Feinberg-because we are dealing with the
State and the citizen, the analysis requires great nuance. This nuance
seems lost upon the argument. Taxpayer-harming conduct fails to
satisfy the requirements of most theories of "publicness," as it creates no fear, does not constitute a moral affront to the community,
and can only even be said to financially impact a portion of the
population.
B.

PRACTICAL EFFECTS

The above-discussed critiques of the taxpayer-harm argument
would probably mean little to most people, and probably little to
most lawyers as well. Often, the small penalties associated with the
violation of these statutes lead many to see this criminalization as
having only trivial impact upon their lives-a $25 ticket is nothing
more than a nuisance, after all. Beyond this, many are content to
rely upon common sense judgment in enforcement. With Fletcher,
though, I believe we must be unwilling to "retreat to prosecutorial
discretion as a surrogate for the principled solution of human conflict." 142 In any case, it is important to remember that law enforcement's constitutional investigatory powers expand exponentially
whenever an activity is a "crime," no matter how small the penalty -there can be real practical liberty implications at stake. In what
follows, I will discuss the practical absurdities that can result from
the criminalization of taxpayer-harming conduct. Hopefully, this
will show why even the non-theorist should be concerned about the
argument. Again, in making this critique I am aware that these laws
can be justified using various other arguments, but remember that
the theory must stand or fall on its own. In taking note of these

142 GEORGE

FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 769 (Little, Brown & Co. 1978).
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practical effects of criminalization, then, imagine that the sole justification for the ultimate law is taxpayer-harm. Is it enough?
First, once conduct becomes "criminal" a whole host of state
interferences become permissible. Criminal investigatory powers
are intrusive because crimes are normally associated with violence,
and there is a compelling need to prevent it before it happens. For
example, even when a crime cannot ultimately be punished with
imprisonment, probable cause alone permits arrest and "booking"
143
in a jail until a Gerstein hearing; this can be for up to 48 hours. Just
this term, a case went before the Supreme Court that highlighted
the problematic practice of uniform body cavity searches for all
processed prison inmates, regardless of their dangerousness, or the
"crime" they were brought in for.144 The petitioner's brief notes that
this practice was used against a twelve-year-old girl who was
caught eating a french fry on the Metro. 145 Unfortunately, the Court
declined to create any distinctions between "crimes" and police investigative power. 146 In another Metro-food-eating case, a woman
reacted emotionally to her body cavity search, and was then locked
in an isolation cell for fifteen hours wearing only her underwear.147
As Stuntz reminds us, "People may not mind making drunk driv-

143Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 124-126 (1975).
1 Brief for Petitioner at 23-25, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty.
of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2011) (No. 10-945).
145Id. at 25 (citing Hedgepeth ex rel. Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
146Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510,
1520-21 (2012)
147Karlyn Barker, Woman Arrestedfor Eating on Metro Sues Over Strip Search, WASH.
POST., Oct. 1, 1980, at C1; see also Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et. al as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7-8, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 354 (2001) (reporting arrests for littering, riding a bicycle without a bell or gong,
operating a business without a license, and walking as to create a hazard).
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ing a crime, but they would surely rebel if police had the same
power over jaywalkers that they sought to use on [drunk drivers].
Yet the police do have that power, and no one rebels." 148 Although
most do not know it (as officers' common sense and prosecutorial
discretion usually prevails), we can indeed be deprived of liberty
and dignity for trivial offenses.
The seminal Supreme Court case is Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista.149 In Atwater, a police officer with a grudge decided to arrest a
woman in front of her terrified children for a seatbelt omission. He
handcuffed her, placed her in his squad car, and processed her in
the jail, where she spent an hour in a cell alone. The Court held that
the punishments for a crime did not have bearing upon the reasonableness of the decision to make a custodial arrest. 150 While the
Court clearly permitted an absurd result to go un-redressed, in my
mind it has some merit: the solution is not to make it more difficult
for police to apprehend criminals, but to take greater care when delineating between who is and who is not acting criminally. The
same powers can be used against the taxpayer-harm violator-is
this appropriate?
There is another familiar problem that arises -ubiquitous, trivial
offenses provide a window through which the investigative power
of the State can enter and expand. They are like a hair trigger that,
once pulled, irreversibly begins a chain reaction allowing for greater intrusion. Trivial offenses "function[] as a grant of authority to
the police." 151 Once the law has some justification to intrude, it can

148William Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Criminal-Civil Line, 7 CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 10 (1996).
149
532 U.S. 318 (2001).
150Id. at 318

s15
See People v. Kail, 501 N.E.2d 979 (11. App. Ct. 1986) (upholding enforcement
of law criminalizing riding of bicycle without bell, which then lead to a searchincident-to-lawful-arrest revealing contraband); Stuntz, supra note 148, at 1 (It is
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find more and more, and privacy shrinks while the powers of investigation expand. If a trivial offense is committed in an officer's presence, he can effect a custodial arrest, and along with it a search incident to lawful arrest. 5 2 Should he find contraband, he has cause to
look for more. 153 Beyond being this hair trigger, the ubiquity of the
offenses gives rise to all the discrimination problems inherent to
any system of discretion. The often-cited example is the traffic code,
l 4
long criticized as a tool to be manipulated against minorities, ' and
our taxpayer-harm offenses are of the same ilk-violators are so
numerous that arrest decisions are left up to the naked discretion of
the officer on the beat. Justice Scalia rightly notes that, if the rule of
law is to have meaning, even an "exorbitant" code cannot have certain parts deprived of effect. 155 Again, though, this means that the
solution is at the legislative juncture - avoid prolixity.
On a final "practical" note, it should be remembered that the
more we extend criminalization beyond the "core," the more we
drain it of its moral weight. Radical positivists might be content to
jettison appeals to such extra-textual foundations of the written
criminal statutes, but for most people there is at least some discomfort with the idea of mala prohibita. As one commentator wrote long

attractive to expand substantive crimes, because this reduces the need to follow elaborate procedural rules; "[trivial offenses] function[] as a grant of authority to the
police.").
152See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973).
1'3See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
154
See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996) ("Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case that the 'multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations' is so large and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty
of violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever they wish for a
stop. But we are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a
code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself
can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement."); Erik Luna, The OvercriminalizationPhenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 726 (2005).
15 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-19.
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ago, "Once it becomes respectable to be convicted, the vitality of the
criminal law has been sapped." 156 In addition, enforcement efforts
directed at these minor crimes, given the all too limited resources of
police agencies, distract from those violent crimes that do threaten
157
public order.
All of these problems and absurdities can arise when conduct
that is generally understood to be of trivial effect is nevertheless
criminalized: the investigatory "hair trigger," temporary detention
that is degrading to dignity and restrictive of liberty, and the sapping of the moral force of the criminal label. Because of this, legislators addressing taxpayer-harming conduct should resist the kneejerk resort to criminalization for deterrence's sake 158 -they must
remember that in doing this, they bring in the procedural baggage
of a criminal law traditionally concerned with violence and public
order. This "baggage" will inhere no matter what the crime is, or its
punishment. We risk what Justice Harlan called "the deployment of
all the incidental machinery of the criminal law," and in an area

156Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 79-80 (1933).
157See Luna, supra note 154, at 727.
1-8 See Henry Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 401,
417 (1958) ("The legislature simply wants certain things done and certain other
things not done because it believes that the doing or the not doing of them will secure some ultimate social advantage, and not at all because it thinks the immediate
conduct involved is either rightful or wrongful in itself. It employs the threat of criminal condemnation and punishment as an especially forceful way of saying that it
really wants to be obeyed, or else simply from lack of enough imagination to think of
a more appropriate sanction."). William Stuntz has written extensively about the
causes behind the overcriminalization phenomenon, in William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001), and has condemned legislatures and courts that, in focusing exclusively on procedure, have failed to create
any substantive limits on crime. See also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
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where it seems least suited. 5 9 Both in theory and in practice, then,
1 60
the taxpayer-harm argument is cause for concern.
C. SUMMARY

As has been explained, the taxpayer-harm argument is seriously
problematic when scrutinized by criminal law theory, and it is also
worrisome in the practical effects it allows. Central to the theoretical
problem is the argument's denuded conception of the State as simply another corporate collective. This is done ostensibly to make the
attribution of a harmful wrong easier, but it ignores the complex
structure of the citizen-State relationship, which contains certain
bedrock duties and rights. Once this is brought back into focus, it
seems unlikely that any interests are set back by taxpayer "harms,"
or that any rights are violated. Moreover, the appeal to a certain
mental state (if it exists at all) to somehow change the duties of the
State and taxpayers in the provision and funding of essential services is unknown in other areas of law -the nascent distinction is
unexplained by the argument, and this is probably because it is in-

159See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

should be recognized that some states have been creative in addressing tax160 It
payer harming conduct, and have gone a long way towards avoiding the problems
we have mentioned. Georgia, for example, explicitly states that a seatbelt violation is
not a crime, and cannot constitute probable cause for additional police intrusions. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-76.1 (2011). Idaho takes another route in addressing the pretext stop problem, and provides that its seatbelt law may only be enforced as a "secondary action," when another violation of the law has been observed. See IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 49-673 (2011). Tennessee makes a violation a misdemeanor, but prohibits police from arresting violators or taking them into custody. See TENN. CODE. ANN.
§55-9-603 (2011). Finally, in South Carolina, violations of seatbelt laws carry civil
fines, and are explicitly not criminal offenses, and do not justify custodial arrest. See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-6540 (2011). In the evacuation context, Louisiana has enacted a
law that, while preventing forcible removal, gives notice that no later rescue will be
attempted, and makes the government immune from damages. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 29:730.3 (2011).
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defensible. This new conception of the State is also problematic,
though, for the requirement that the conduct have a public character: those who do not financially contribute are unaffected, and
therefore any harmful wrong appears more like a private one. Finally, the criminalization of this innocuous conduct permits practical
absurdities: the harsh implements of the criminal law's investigatory powers are permitted to be applied indiscriminately. The taxpayer-harm argument does not justify criminalization.
IV.

PARADIGM SHIFT

To say that taxpayer-harm does not justify criminalization is not
to say that the government should be at a loss when addressing the
problem. In what follows, I will discuss what I believe is an excellent alternative to the criminal sanction, and one that solves problems both in theory and in practice: civil liability.
A.

THE IMPORT OF THE CRIMINAL-CIVIL DISTINCTION: CRIME AS LAST
RESORT

Whenever a polity is presented with a social problem, it has a
diverse number of tools with which it can attempt to confront it.
Legislatively, these generally fall within two distinct categories:
criminal and civil. While much has been written about the gradual
erosion of any hermetic seal between them, 161 the distinction has
deep theoretical bases that in turn manifest themselves in practice.
Conflation, or inversion (as is our case here) of the two is then likely

161

See generally Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between

Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and
Procedure:Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil ProceduralDivide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775,
793-95 (1997).
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to produce major inconsistencies -all of the issues analyzed above
bear this thesis out. As the Supreme Court has written, "The States
have long been able to plan their own procedures around the traditional
distinction between civil and criminal remedies. The abandonment of this
clear dividing line in favor of a general assessment of the manifold and
complex purposes that lie behind a court's action would create novel problems where now there are rarely any-novel problems that could infect
many different areas of the law. ' 1

62

This is true, as we have seen, both

theoretically and in practice.
Criminal punishment, of course, should be the last resort, the
ultima ratio in the State's toolbox. This idea has been most forcefully
espoused by Douglas Husak, who fleshes out such a common sense
conclusion in this manner: "The criminal law is different and must
be evaluated by a higher standard of justification because it burdens
interests not implicated when other modes of social control are employed." 163 Handcuffs and prison bars are simply more regrettable
implements in a free society than are taxes, lawsuits, or fees. But
beyond liberty, there is a stigma. 164 Because of these reasons, far

162Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 636-37 (1988). Similarly, in the classic article on the civil-criminal line, Jerome Hall writes, "the two fields of law differ
in very important respects and ... their unification... would be [possibly] dangerous to certain values presently implemented by the prevailing legal distinctions."
Jerome Hall, Interrelationsof Criminal Law and Torts: 1, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 755
(1943).
163Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law As Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207,
234 (2004). See generally Nils Jareborg, Criminalisationas Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2
OHIO ST. L. J. 521 (2005).
164
Hart writes, "[criminal conduct] is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken
place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of
the community." Hart, supra note 158, at 405; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991) ("[T]he factor that most distinguishes the
criminal law is its operation as a system of moral education and socialization.").
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from instinctively jumping to criminalization, 165 we ought to strain
ourselves to find alternatives to it. Thus, Feinberg admonishes,
"[f]or every criminal prohibition designed to prevent some social
evil, there is a range of alternative techniques for achieving, at
somewhat less drastic cost, the same purpose." 166 Such a position
depends, of course, upon a non-consequentialist punitive theory,
which does not see the civil-criminal "distinction" as merely one of
quantitative difference in deterrent value. 167 Taking the retributive
position, we can incorporate Jerome Hall's central thesis: "[The]
elementary principle [is] that the nature of the harm should bear a
rational relation to the sanction .. .[and] that sanctions resemble
harms not only formally, but also in substance." 168 Is the uninten-

165See Coffee, supra note 164, at 219 ("Public concern about a newly perceived social problem.., seems to trigger a recurring social response: namely, an almost reflexive resort to criminal prosecution.").
166Feinberg, supra note 7, at 25. Feinberg gives an example of taxation as an incentive or disincentive, such as with smoking. Id. This is the route taken by the Affordable Care Act. See supra note 3. See also Epstein, The Tort/CrimeDistinction:A Generation
Later, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996) ("In principle it would seem that when tort law normally remedies the relevant harm, civil fines should be the preferred public response."); Dworkin, supra note 5, at 126 (proposing adoption of "principle of least
restrictive alternative," where "[i]f there is an alternative way of accomplishing the
deserved end without restricting liberty, although it may involve great expense,
inconvenience, etc., the society must adopt it.").
167"The deterrence approach largely accepts the reductionist view. There is no
significant difference between civil and criminal sanctions, except that a rational
government will classify certain conduct as qualifying for potential imprisonment as
well as for compensatory relief. Fines, taxes, and forfeitures are all of a piece." Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of the Criminal Law: Toward a "Regulatory Model" of or
"Pathological Perspective" on, the Civil-CriininalDistinction, 7 J.CONTEMP.LEGAL ISSUFS
199, 200 (1996). Cf Steiker, supra note 161, at 784 (noting that the major "intellectual
challenge" to the criminal-civil line is consequentialism, which sees the two as "related parts of a unitary scheme of state control of private behavior.").
168Hall, supra note 97, at 999. "[lIn penal law ... the immorality of the actor's conduct is essential -whereas pecuniary damage is irrelevant," Hall writes later, and
"individual harm can be rationally evaluated in money whereas this is impossible as
to... social harm" Id. at 971, 974.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 7:126

176

tional, pecuniary "harm" we have descried truly related to the punitive sanctions of the criminal law, or is it more akin to the compensatory sanction of civil liability?
B.

THE CRIMINAL-CIVIL LINE

& TAXPAYER

HARMS

I think the answer is clear: civil liability. 169 "If one engages in
conduct 0, one is civilly liable for the governmental costs incurred." This
simple formulation is the type of statute or regulation I am proposing.

170

Here, the traditional justification for invoking criminal law that we
found so wanting - a wrongful public harm - drops out of the picture, and is replaced with the lower demands of civil law: fault,
causation, and damage. 171 The first is easily satisfied by the public
promulgation of the civil regulation, with its violation constituting

169There are other non-criminal regulatory alternatives, but I pass over them.
Simester and Von Hirsch describe them well: taxes, statutory torts (my chosen alternative), public information campaigns, licensing, civil regulatory agencies, and "specialized prohibitions" on non-ordinary actors such as corporations. See A.P. SIMESTER
& A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, HARMS, AND WRONGS 193-96 (Oxford: Hart, 2011).
170There is a robust debate in legal scholarship over the wisdom of the reigning
"free public services doctrine" -the tort principle that prevents a government from
suing to recoup losses incurred through the provision of its services. Compare Michael I. Krauss, Public Services Meet Private Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2007) (arguing in favor of doctrine), with Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2001) (arguing against the doctrine), and Timothy D. Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs of
PublicServices from Tortfeasors?:Tort Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading,and the Free
PublicServices Doctrine, 76 TUL. L. REV. 727 (2002) (same). However, my proposal
avoids the imbroglio of this debate, which is essentially about the judicial extension
or contraction of common law tort doctrines. See Krauss, supra, at 22. My proposal asks
for legislative modification, and legislative modification of the common law has always been unquestioned.
171See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); Ernest J. Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice, 77 IOWA L. REV.
403,418 (1992).
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per se fault. 172 The problems inherent in the use of a reckless mental
state are obviated; unintentional recklessness has never been problematic in civil tort law, which requires only negligence (and sometimes not even that), 173 and the civil regulation has the advantages
of notice. 174 Causation is easily established as well: the conduct will
be the cause in fact of the aggravated cost, and this aggravation is
clearly foreseeable given the promulgation just mentioned and the
ubiquitous social facts that all should be aware of.175 Finally, the
damage inflicted is more cognizable in the civil law than as a criminal law "harm." Now, the narrow, private-law-like financial concerns of the State qua corporation are unproblematic. Now, the State
is not leveling its cause of action as the State, with all of its concomitant moral authority, but simply as another entity that has been financially damaged.
In comparing the requirements for liability to attach in the criminal and civil laws, we could summarize by saying that civil law is
concerned with "objective liability": an act that actually causes a
harmful result, "actual damage to an individual interest," irrespective of any blameworthiness as manifested by a mental state. 176 This
is unlike the "subjective liability" of crime, which gives primacy of
place to mens rea when assessing liability, and is far less preoccu-

172See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 (2010) (describing doctrine of negligence per se).
173See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (permitting strict liability in
certain cases); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (establishing floor of
negligence).
174When compared to the common law creation of a tort.
17-See Richard Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1741-50 (1985)
(describing proximate cause and factual causation inquiries).
176See Mann, supra note 161, at 1805.
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pied with results. 177 All this supports our argument. With taxpayer
harms, it is not the mental state or even the risky act that gives rise
to the concern animating the theory-it is the actually inflicted
monetary deprivation, the result. While this actual resultant harm is
arguably addressed by ex ante deterrence of a trivial criminal penalty, it is more precisely addressed by the ex post compensatory action
typical of the civil law (which itself has deterrent value as well): the
damages sought will equal the deprivation caused. An emphasis on
results, while more directly addressing the damage inflicted, also
has the advantage of being less restrictive of liberty, as liability inheres only when the cost is actually incurred.
This relaxation of the theoretical requirements that occurs in the
shift from criminal to civil law ultimately flows from their differing
purposes and remedies, and an examination of these similarly supports our argument for paradigm shift. In civil law, compensation is
the aim, not punishment, and money damages are the usual remedy, not stigmatization and incarceration. 178 In a criminal context, an
irreparable loss to social utility has usually been suffered, and because of this the only response to it can be a further loss of social
utility through punishment. With taxpayer harms in civil law,
though, all that has happened is misplacement (not destruction) of
social utility, and all that is required to make things right is a reallocation. Taxpayer-harming conduct, with its pervasively pecuniary
and morally neutral focus, is precisely the type of misdistribution of
social utility that demands monetary rectification, not punishment.
If accidental fiscal loss is the problem animating this legislative project, then the solution is a fiscal payment in the actual amount of the

177"Within the criminal paradigm, wrongful acts are sanctioned because they are
public wrongs, violating a collective rather than an individual interest.., even if no
individual interest has suffered direct injury." Id.
178See id. at 1808-09.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

2013]

TAXPAYERS AS VICTIMS

loss inflicted. 7 9 There is no need for those additional consequences
that the criminal law provides, stigmatization or moral education. 180
The statutes we have surveyed do not bring opprobrium to those
convicted, and have done little if anything to correct the characters
of the offenders or society more generally: usually, the effect is iatrogenic, with the enforcing officers becoming the object of ridicule,
8
and general respect for law diminished.' '
Given all of the above discussion about the different purposes
and remedies of the two types of law, it is unsurprising that the enforcement powers of each differ vastly. In the civil law, the "practical"
problems of police investigation completely drop out, as those
powers attach only when the conduct being investigated is criminal- now the police will not be involved at all. The shift to civil law
would remove the constitutional-procedural "trigger" that taxpayer-harm violations have become, and those intrusive investigatory
techniques of the criminal law that smack of such absurdity when

179 The most basic objection to this compensatory schema is a practical one- the
judgment-proof plaintiff. However, even assuming this problem, there is no reason
to believe that there will be a net financial gain by a resort to the criminal sanction.
Such an assumption relies upon the idea of ex ante deterrence, but it is likely the case
that the potential of civil liability will deter as much if not more than that of a petty
criminal fine. In any case, the soundness of legal theories should not be impugned
simply because of a presumption that some people will not obey their prescriptions.
180
See JEAN HAMPTON, THE INTRINSIC WORTH OF PERSONS 111-12, (Daniel Farnham
ed., 2007) (arguing that the difference between a wrongful harm requiring retribution
and a wrongful harm requiring compensation is a "moral injury" that expresses an
affront to the victim's value or dignity). Clearly, such a framework supports our
paradigm shift.
181
When the American Law Institute recommended the abolishment of crimes
prohibiting consensual sexual activity, it gave three reasons: ubiquitous violations
undermined respect for the rule of law; the conduct was private and not harmful to
others, and; the criminalization of such behavior created danger of arbitrary enforcement. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (citing comment approvingly). All three observations apply
equally to taxpayer harm crimes.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty

180

[Vol. 7:126

applied to certain conduct would be prohibited. The greatest nuisance that could be visited upon a defendant is that enabled
182
through discovery and subpoenas.
C.

ALIENABILITY RULE TO LIABILITY RULE, SANCTION TO PRICE

As has been discussed, the purposes, remedies, requirements
for liability, and procedures of the civil law make it an altogether
more appropriate tool to use in addressing taxpayer-harming conduct than those of criminal law. A broader view of the distinction
further supports this conclusion, and can be illustrated by looking
to some theoretical schemas.
In Calabresian terminology, for example, the shift from criminal
to civil paradigm is basically a modification of an inalienability rule
into a liability rule. 183 An inalienability rule is appropriate, Calabresi and Melamed argue, when external costs are "non-monetizeable"
or when any transaction of an entitlement creates significant externalities. 184 Thus, most crimes 185 are inalienability rules: the cost of
conduct that is malum in se cannot be priced, and it always produces
disutility. Liability rules, however, arise when "holdout" and "freeloader" problems prevent the value of entitlements from being collectively agreed upon, or when that value is unavailable in advance. 186 It is no surprise, then, that the paradigmatically appropriate case for a liability rule is when addressing the cost of an "acci-

See Mann, supra note 161, at 1810-11.
182
183
See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124-25
(1972).
18 Id. at 1111-14.
185Some crimes involve property rules, such as rape and theft.
186See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 183, at 1106-10.
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dent." 187 Taxpayer-harming conduct creates precisely monetizeable
external costs (the medical or the rescue bill), and can be undertaken without producing any negative externalities at all (e.g. the seatbelt scofflaw who arrives home safely), so an inalienability rule
seems unduly restrictive. The problems that do attend to this conduct are precisely those of the "accident" that makes a liability rule
appropriate: holdout and freeloader problems abound in the case of
the brazen non-evacuee or the motorist lacking medical insurance,
and the value of the entitlement is simply impossible to gauge before the point at which it becomes useful (for example, no one
knows what the extent of one's injuries will be).
We could also call this conversion a shift from a sanction to a
price. In an influential article, Robert Cooter writes: "A sanction is a
detriment imposed for doing what is forbidden, and a price is an
amount of money exacted for doing what is permitted." 188 Typically, he argues, activities should be "sanctioned" when there is some
clear community standard against the conduct, and unclear external
costs associated with said conduct- this is true of core criminal acts,
such as homicide-and "priced" when the opposite is true. 189 Given
that the conduct behind taxpayer harms implicates no clear moral
standard and imposes costs that can be precisely calculated, a pricerule makes the most sense. John Coffee sums up the distinction in
layman's terms: "The difference is between saying '[piroceed at
[y]our [oiwn [r]isk' and '[h]alt."' 1 90 Because we are not truly con-

187
Id.
188Robert Cooter, Pricesand Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1552 (1984).
189
Id.
190Coffee, supra note 164, at 208. Simester and Von Hirsch note that a tort is an
"[inicomplete alternative" precisely because it can only price: it "lacks the mandatory
and condemnatory character of the criminal law." A.P. SLMESrER & A. VON HIRSCH,
CRIMEs, HARMS, AND WRONGS 194 (Oxford: Hart, 2011). In the case of taxpayer
harms, though, I find this incompleteness to be a virtue.
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cerned about the conduct itself, but rather with the attenuated financial effects of that conduct being inappropriately imposed on a third
party, it makes far more sense to craft legal rules that force the actor
to simply assume the risk, and not categorically stop him from acting at all.
D.

SUMMARY

In summation, a shift from criminal to civil liability is advantageous for a number of reasons. First, the theoretical, substantive
requirements for criminality that were problematic for taxpayerharming conduct (harmfulness, publicness, and wrongfulness) drop
out, and are replaced by the more lax demands of civil law (fault,
causation, damage). This conduct can easily meet the latter requirements in the wake of a promulgated civil liability regulation.
This shift to a system of objective, results-based liability is also less
restrictive on individual liberty -liability and sanction only attach
when actual harm is inflicted. An ex post compensation, the price,
also more directly addresses the actual damage created than do
trivial ex ante criminal fines. The underlying purposes that animate
the criminal-civil distinction (and shape their different remedies)
also counsel placing these restrictions within the civil paradigm, as
the compensatory aim and the utilization of money damages is precisely what addresses the problem complained of by the taxpayerharm argument: a misallocation of social utility in the form of money. Taxpayer harms, of all mala prohibita, are especially cognizable
by the civil law. While monetary compensation might do little to
address the social problems that motivate prohibitions on tainted
meat, for example, it is the perfect answer when the social evil the
prohibition seeks to eradicate is purely a financial loss. The objections that normally attend to the criminalization of morally neutral
activity are also obviated, as there is no drain on the moral significance of the criminal law as an educational and stigmatizing tool.
Finally, while litigative procedural hurdles are significantly lowered, intrusive police investigatory powers are entirely curtailed.
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Theorists that demarcate between alienability rules and liability
rules, and between sanctions and prices, provide guideposts for
choosing one or the other, and these support my position.
CONCLUSION

The taxpayer-harm argument is a tremendously powerful tool: it
allows for the individualistic impulses of most citizens to be pacified by rationalizing paternalistic criminal statutes as necessary to
prevent harm to the public more generally. However, the argument
has a number of weaknesses when scrutinized by criminal law theory, and does not seem to hold water except under the most radical
utilitarian deterrence jurisprudence. Under more mainstream
views, though, the conduct punished by taxpayer-harm statutes
must be shown to be harmful in a legally cognizable way, wrongful,
and of concern to the public. Taxpayer harm fails to meet these requirements, and it is no surprise that theoretical inconsistencies lead
to practical absurdities, with intrusive police investigatory powers
permitted in innocuous spheres of behavior. If the concern over
taxpayer harm is genuinely central, and not just a makeweight for
paternalism, then legislators should roll back criminalization in
these areas. A solution to problems both in principle and practice and one that does not ignore the underlying pecuniary concerns
animating the legislation-is found in moving the regulation of
taxpayer-harming conduct from the punitive-criminal to the compensatory-civil paradigm. If, on the other hand, legislators' invocation of the taxpayer-harm argument in criminalization is really just
a supplement to paternalistic arguments emphasizing the intrinsic
value of human life, our preceding discussion still has value: it
means that the this makeweight cannot do the work it must, and
should be wholly abandoned.
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